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REGIONALIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. EDWARD T. TAYLOR
OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, December 21, 1937
ANALYSIS OF AND COMMENTS ON THE MANSFIELD BILL
(H. R. 7365)

Mr. Taylor of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, on June 3 last
Representative Mansfield, the chairman of the Committee
on Rivers and Harbors, introduced a bill (H. R. 7365) to
provide for the regional conservation and development of the
national resources, and for other purposes. The bill contains 53 pages.
There was a companion bill introduced at the same time
in the Senate by Senator Norris-S. 2555. Those bills are
of almost unlimited scope. Their objects are "to develop,
integrate, and coordinate plans, projects, and activities for
or incidental to the promotion of navigation, the control and
prevention of floods, the safeguarding of navigable waters,
and the reclamation of public lands, to conserve the waters,
soil, minerals, and forest resources of the Nation," and so
forth. While many of the main purposes of those measures
are laudable, insofar as they apply to the waters of the streams
throughout the entire arid region of the West they are in bold
violation of, and absolutely destructive of, the vested property rights and the established system of development of any
western resources by irrigation and reclamation of our public
and private lands. They utterly ignore the doctrine of priority of water rights by appropriation, which is the foundation of all the agricultural development throughout the arid
West.
The entire delegation in Congress from 13 of the western
States are unalterably opposed to the measure in its present
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form and we have appeared before that Committee and presented as forcibly as we could, our objections to it. I made
an exhaustive statement myself before that committee about
10 days ago, presenting what I believe are the sentiments
and rights of the people of those States concerning the waters
within that region. At that time, I presented to the committee "An analysis of and comments on the Mansfield bill.
H. R. 7365," as it would affect our western States. That analysis was prepared by the Colorado Water Conservation
Board, which is an official organization headed by the Governor and created by law with authority to speak for the State
of Colorado. That analysis has been prepared by some half
dozen of Colorado's ablest lawyers, including our attorney
general and several eminent engineers, including our State
engineer. I feel very earnestly that Congress and the country should be fully advised as to the effect that the regionalizing program would have on the West.
By permission of the House I enclose herewith that analysis, as follows:
H. R. 7365
A bill to provide for regional conservation and development of the
national resources and for other purposes
ANALYSIS OF THE MANSFIELD BILL,

DIVISIONS OF THE BILL

The bill is 53 pages long. One division is title I, another title II,
and a third title III. The first states, among other things, the purpose
*of the bill, and creates seven regional planning agencies which are to be
instrumentalities of the Government, and which are to recommend plans
to the President and the Congress of projects and activities for the
utilization of water, soil, minerals, and forests of their respective regions.
Title II authorizes, among other things, the President to create
regional power authorities to construct, acquire, and operate power
plants and to sell or distribute electrical energy, and in connection with
such operation to serve also the interests of navigation, flood control,
and irrigation. Title II does not provide primarily for projects other
than for electrical energy.
Title III authorizes the appropriation of such sums from time to
time as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the act.
THE PURPOSES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS OF THE BILL

The purposes of the bill and the constitutional grounds specified
in support of the purposes are set forth in title I, section 1, and are to
control floods, safeguard navigation, reclaim public lands, conserve the
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water, soil, mineral, and forest resources of the Nation, stabilize and
increase employment-all to the end of promoting interstate commerce,
the national defense, and the general welfare.
TITLE I OF THE BILL DEALING WITH PLANNING AGENCIES ANALYZED
IN GREATER DETAIL

Regional planning agencies
One planning agency is created for each of seven specified drainage
basins, to wit: The Atlantic seaboard planning agency; Great LakesOhio planning agency; Tennessee Valley planning agency; Missouri
Valley planning agency; Arkansas planning agency; Southwestern
planning agency; and the Columbia Valley planning agency (sec. 2).
Since drainage basins include both streams and tributaries, it follows
that the jurisdiction of the agencies would extend to tributaries. The
President may redefine from time to time the territorial boundaries of
the seven regions (sec. 2).
Regional directors and committees
Each planning agency is to consist of a regional conservation committee or committees, of which a regional planning director shall be a
member and the chief administrative officer. All are appointed by the
President, and the appointment of the director is to be confirmed by
the Senate (sec. 3 (a) (b) ). The regional director carries out the
policies of the conservation committee (sec. 3 (c) ).
"The regional planning agencies shall be subject to the supervision
and control of the President * * * for the purpose of insuring
appropriate conformity of regional plans to a national policy and
appropriate coordination of regional plans" (sec. 4 (a) ).
The most important functions of the planning agencies are to
study and to devise and submit plans to the President and to the
Congress for projects whereby to bring about the most economical use
of the Nation's water, soil, mineral, and forest resources, including the
control of water run-off (sec. 4 (b) ). In doing this the agencies are
to cooperate in their investigations with other departments of the Government and to have the right to commandeer the latters' services and
information (sec. 4 (b) ). So, too, the agencies are to cooperate with
the States and public and cooperative agencies (nothing is said, however, about cooperation with private agencies that are not organized on
a cooperative basis) in accumulating data and development of plans

(sec. 4 (c)).
In submitting plans to the President the agencies shall include
recommendations conducive to cooperation among State, Federal,
regional, and local agencies in carrying out plans, projects, and activities,
and also shall include recommendations for legislation to the same general end (sec. 4 (d)).
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Submission of plans
Once a year each regional planning agency shall submit to the
President plans for the construction and the undertaking during the
succeeding fiscal year of projects in line with the purposes of the bill,
namely, conservation and prudent use of the water, soil, mineral, and
forest resources; also prevention of floods, safeguarding navigation,
reclamation of public lands, conservation of the water, soil, mineral,
and forest resources of the Nation (sec. 5 (a)).
If the President approves any of the plans, he is to refer them to
the Congress with his recommendations, and he may call upon the
agencies for plans for such projects -s he desires in carrying out the
purposes of the act (sec. 5 (b) ). When "plans involve * * * integrated developments traversing the geographic region of two or more
regional planning agencies the President may assign or reassign to any
one of such regional planning agencies as he finds necessary * * * or
appropriate to obtain the advantages of natural and economic boundaries in the planning of such integrated developments" (sec. 5 (b)).
Preparationof plans
Plans shall include projects and activities adapted to conservation
and integrated development of water, soil, and forest resources, and
include "improved methods of soil conservation, utilization of fertilization and cultivation" (sec. 6 (a) (2) ).
Plans shall include "conservation of water for power, irrigation,
and other beneficial uses," prudent husbandry of natural resources, and
the "integration and iiiterconnection of projects and activities" (sec. 6
(b) (1) (2) (4)).
Plans may include projects to be constructed by various departments of Government or by regional agencies or by the States or by the
latters' subdivisions and to be financed by the United States or the
States (or the latters' subdivisions) or by both (sec. 6 (c) ).
Plans contemplate jurisdiction of planning agencies over tributaries
as well as main streams (sec. 6 (a) (1) (3)).
Plans shall classify projects in order of urgency to promote employment (sec. 6 (d)).
Interstate compacts
Consent of Congress is given to States to enter into interstate
compacts "(1) to further and supplement on behalf of the States the
purposes of this act and (2) to carry out on behalf of the States appropriate projects and activities in relation thereto" (sec. 7).
"Any such agreement or compact shall not become effective or binding upon the States party thereto unless and until it shall have been
submitted to and approved by the President after consultation with the
regional planning agency within whose geographic region the projects
or activities contemplated by such agreement or compact are to be carried
out" (sec. 7).
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Pollution
Unlawful to pollute streams over which the Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce between the States or
with foreign nations. (sec. 8.)
TITLE II. DEALING WITH REGIONAL POWER AUTHORITIES ANALYZED
IN GREATER DETAIL

Creation and composition
The President is authorized to create, by Executive order, corporate regional power authorities when and wherever, and as numerous,
as he deems best, and regardless of the seven planning regions established
by title I of the bill (sec. 201 (a)).
Each power authority is to have an administrator to be appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and a Regional Power
Board, whose members (not less than three or more than five, including
the director) are to be appointed by the President. (Sec. 201 (c), (d),
The Board determines policies and the Administrator carries
(e).)
them out (sec. 201 (e)).
Some of powers
The power authorities are to have the right to construct and operate power plants and transmission lines and to sell and distribute energy
either at wholesale or retail in the cities and in the country; and to the
power authorities the President, if he deems best, may transfer by executive order already existing plants operated by other departments (Bureau
of Reclamation for instance) or agencies of the Government (secs. 201
(a) 203 (a), (c), (d), (e)).
States, districts, municipalities, and cooperatives are to be preferred
over others as purchasers of power (sec. 203 (d) ).
Rate schedules for the sale of energy must be approved by the
Federal Power Commission (sec. 203 (f)).
The rates, having regard to recovery of cost and to appropriate
reserves for maintenance and upkeep and amortization of capital investment over a period of years shall be such as to encourage the widest
possible use of electrical energy; and where the generation of energy
is only one of several purposes of a project, the cost shall be fairly
allocated among the purposes to encourage the widest possible use of
water for irrigation and of electric energy (sec. 203 (f) (g)).
Reports
Each power authority shall submit to the President and the Congress annual financial reports of their respective businesses and of the
status and progress of their projects and activities (sec. 206 (a)). The
Comptroller General may audit (sec. 205 (b)).
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Injunctions
Injunctions against the authorities or their representatives are made
difficult to obtain, and where temporary injunctions are wrongfully
obtained by the plaintiff or complainant the damages, including loss of
income, may be assessed against the bond right in the same injunction
suit (sec. 207 (b) , (c) , (d),

(e) ).

Jurisdiction of courts
The Federal courts are given exclusive jurisdiction of all suits
against the power authorities or their representatives (sec. 207 (a),
(b)).
Condemnation proceedings
The authorities may mtintain suits to condemn both real and
personal property for the purposes of the act (sec. 208).
Dams of the United States
All dams now being constructed or hereafter to be constructed anywhere by the United States are, where practicable, to be so constructed
as to make possible the generation of power, to the end that water may
not be wasted; and adverse reports on such practicability shall be submitted to the President for consideration and final decision (sec. 209).
Receipts
Receipts of each authority go to the Treasury of the United States
for the credit of "Miscellaneous receipts" (sec. 211).
TITLE III OF THE BILL

Appropriations
There are hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time
such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act
(sec. 301).
OBJECTIONS TO THE MANSFIELD BILL, H. R. 7365

A bill to provide for the regional conservation and development of the
national resources, and other purposes
INTRODUCTION

While there are arguments for a comprehensive and integrated development of a river system as a whole and for plans whereby to bring
such a development about in order to conserve the water, soil, mineral,
and forest resources of the Nation, yet the opposing arguments as applied
to the Mansfield bill are the more weighty. It is the purpose of these
comments to state these objections.
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The bill erroneously asserts that the ownership or control of the country's waters is in the Federal Government, thus ignoring in its theory
the field of ownership or control that is in the States.
The bill erroneously assumes, both impliedly and expressly, that
the ownership or control of the country's waters is in the Federal Government rather than in the States.
The very plans for the comprehensive development of projects and
activities along stream systems, regardless of State lines, and the very
prohibitions laid down by the bill upon the States, testify to such an
implied assumption without the aid of any express declaration.
The bill contains, however, an express declaration. It provides
that whenever, by it or any other act of the Congress, any project
or activity within the scope of the plans of the Authority, "is entrusted
to an authority, such authority shall construct, operate, and carry out
such projects or activities primarily for the promotion of navigation,
control, and prevention of floods, safeguarding of navigable waters,
and the reclamation of public lands. In order to effectuate such primary
purposes with the greatest public benefits, and so far as is consistent
with such primary purposes, to avoid the waste of water, water power,
and other property of the United States, such authority, except as the
Congress may otherwise provide, shall have such powers as may be
necessary to operate and carry out such project or activities * * *"
(sec. 203 (a)).
Here we have an express declaration that classifies the "water" and
"water power" as part of the "property of the United States." What
"water" is, needs no explanation. What "water power is, as the term
is used in the bill, is not defined, but it probably means such flows of
water that as to volume, fall, and location could be used in the production of electrical energy. The point is that both are expressly said
to be the "property of the United States."
Undoubtedly the Congress, under the commerce clause of the Constitution, may regulate and protect navigation where it relates to interstate and foreign commerce, and, where there is such a relation, may
include flood control, and do it without asking the permission of the
States. The exercise of this right does not, however, exhaust the control of all of the waters of the country's streams or all that can be done
with them. There is a residuum of general ownership or control in the
States or in those persons who under State law have acquired rights in
respect to the water. The countless instances of the use of stream waters
everywhere by owners of riparian lands in the States of the East and
Middle West and by the appropriators of water in the States of the
West, where the priority or appropriation system of water rights prevails, attest indisputably to the existence of this residuum of water
ownership or control that is beyond the reach of the Federal Government. This general ownership or control in the States has the support
of the highest judicial authority. In Kansas v. Colorado (206 U. S.
46), which involved the Arkansas River, it was held by the Supreme

DICTA
Court of the United States that where the interstate commerce clause of
the Constitution, with its resulting right to protect navigation, is not
involved the powers of the States over the waters within their boundaries are supreme just by virtue of their simple statehood as members of
the Union. In Nebraska v. Wyoming (295 U. S. 40), which involved
the North Platte, the same Court decided that claims of the Government
to water within the boundaries of a State for irrigation are like the
claims of private citizens, in that whatever would bind the State and its
citizens in respect to the use of water as against another State and the
latter's citizens upon an interstate stream would bind equally the United
States, just as if it were a private water user, and that in a suit where
interstate commerce is not involved the United States is sufficiently
represented by the State and cannot intervene as a party to the suit.
In the 17 States of the West where the priority or appropriation
system of water law prevails there are 7 that claim that mere admission
to the Union itself gives them, except where interstate commerce powers
of the Federal Constitution are involved, the right of ownership or
control over their respective water-a position approved by the Supreme
Court in Kansas against Colorado, above cited.
Then there is the case of California-OregonPower Co. v. Beaver
Portland Cement Co. (295 U. S. 142) in which the Supreme Court
held that the Congress by act of July 26, 1866, which was the act
opening up the mineral portion of the public domain to private purchase, and by the Desert Act of 1877, the Congress of the United States
had turned over whatever interest it had in the waters to the States.
This transfer of ownership or control did not involve, of course, any
surrender by the Federal Government of the powers which the Congress has under the interstate commerce clause, but surely this transfer
having been made cannot now be recalled.
In the 31 States of the East and Middle West where the riparian
system of water law is found, the ownership of the right to water,
to the extent not affected by the interstate commerce clause is, under
State law, in the owner of the riparian lands bordering upon the streams.
In the appropriation States it is, under State law, in the appropriator.
Under both systems of water law the general control is in the States.
If the United States happens to own land bordering upon a stream in
the former case, or is an appropriator in the latter case, then the United
States like any private person is the owner of a right to water but holds
its right under the law and authority of the State. If in the appropriation or priority States there are waters not yet appropriated, the
general right to authorize the appropriation thereof is not in the United
States but in the State.
In the section of the bill above quoted (sec. 203 (a)) the "reclamation of the public lands" is one of the declared functions of the authorities. Water to reclaim public lands has nothing to do with functions
or objectives relating to interstate commerce either byway of promoting
navigation or controlling floods or otherwise. The right of the Govern-
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ment to water wherewith to reclaim its public lands is a good example
of a right that, when coming into existence, is created by the State in
favor of the United States just as if it would be in favor of any private
individual who acquires a right to water to reclaim his own lands.
Neither riparian nor appropriation States are likely to subscribe
to the bill's assertion of ownership, control, and disposition in the
Federal Government or to the bill's vast plans for any integrated development of the stream system as a whole regardless of State lines and
State authority. Rather will the States themselves want to determine
their water future and thereby the future of the industries dependent
upon it.
The powers the States do not give up they still retain.
Many of the functions of existing Federalagencies would be
curtailed or duplicated
The planning agencies are required, after investigation, to formulate plans for the general development of the water, soil, forest, and
mineral resources of the country (secs. 4, 5, and 6). This requirement
would be at best a duplication of the work of the other instrumentalities
of the Government including the Bureau of Reclamation of the Interior
Department, the Corps of Army Engineers of the War Department, and
the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture, which
both plan and execute. At its worst, the requirement would indicate
that the functions of these other Federal instrumentalities are to be
superseded.
In either event the planning functions would be better performed
if they could remain where they are now, since they demand a high
order of centralized research and experience and also because the present
instrumentalities have the country's confidence. Not only would the
planning instrumentalities be either curtailed or duplicated, but there
would be an abridgment of the functions of the other Federal instrumentalities in respect to the transfer to the Power Authorities of projects,
or parts of projects, that are now or hereafter would be controlled by
the other Federal instrumentalities if the bill were not passed (sec. 201
(a) 203 (a) (b)).
Under the present law the Bureau of Reclamation, primarily in
charge of the reclamation of lands, frequently generates and disposes
of power as a byproduct; and the Corps of Army Engineers in charge
of dams for the purpose of navigation and flood control does, and plans
to do, the same thing likewise as a byproduct.
By way of further particularity concerning curtailment and duplication it may be added that under the Mansfield bill the Power Authorities are given the right to construct and control such "facilities capable
of producing hydroelectric power" together with "appurtenant works"
as may be entrusted to them by any act of the Congress, the only exception being that if the facilities are in any way associated with the
promotion of navigation and have "locks, lifts, fishways and navigable
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facilities in connection therewith" these latter shall be operated by the
War Department (sec. 203 (a) (b) ).
The President by Executive order may transfer to such a Power
Authority "facilities capable of producing hydroelectric power (together
with appurtenant works constructed, under construction or hereafter
to be constructed by, or on behalf of the United States," meaning by
any other agency or department of the United States (sec. 201 (a) ).
"Facilities * * * together with appurtenant works" is a phrase
broad enough to include dams, release gates, spillways, penstocks, dynamos-practically the entire control of a dam project---even though the
project is one performing the multiple functions such as controlling
floods, supplying water for irrigation, and municipal purposes as well
as generating power.
The only exception to the control of the entirety of the project
by the Power Authority, as far as concerns the operation of the dam
or the impounding and release of water for the various purposes of the
project, is that if the promotion of navigation is connected with the
project then "locks, lifts, and fishways and the navigation facilities
employed in connection therewith are to be operated by the War Department" (sec. 203 (b)). Apparently flood control itself goes along with
the "facilities" and "appurtenant works" to the power authorities.
At any rate that particular function is not expressly exempted
from the control of the power authorities. Just how it is going to be
practically feasible for the different instrumentalities of the Government
to impound and release waters at the same time when the functions are
various and when they conflict as to their respective necessities, the bill
does not explain. Where the generation of power is only one of several
functions it should be looked upon -as a byproduct as compared with
the others and, in the frequent conflicts of exercise, should be subordinated. This subordination would not be any too likely to be given
effect when the transfer of the other project is to an unsympathetic
power authority whose primary purpose is power generation.
From these considerations it appears that if the bill were passed,
the functions of important existing Government instrumentalities, including the Corps of Army Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation and Soil
Conservation Service would be curtailed or duplicated in planning.
execution, and administration.
The bill either abridges or authorizes plans which, if executed, would
abridge functions of the States or their agencies, either by limitation
or duplication.
The States could not, if the bill were passed, authorize towns and
cities, mines, mills, and factories "to pollute or to make unsightly waters
of or flowing into navigable streams or other streams over which the
Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several States" (sec. 8). Since most
streams, if not themselves navigable, flow into streams that are navigable,
the practical universality in effect of such a prohibition is apparent.
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State water-administration officials, State planning commissions
formulating plans for the utilization of the water, soil, minerals, and
forest resources of the country are not assured with certainty of consideration by these super-regional planning agencies, since the latter need
cooperate with the States only "insofar as practicable," which means
insofar as the planning agency itself deems practicable (sec. 4 (c) ).
State utility commissions could not fix the rates on electric energy,
since these are to be determined by the Federal Power Commission, upon
which great areas of the country would not be represented (sec. 203
(f)).
States could not negotiate interstate compacts without the consent
of the President (sec. 7), whereas under the Constitution the States
have a right to invoke the consent of the Congress, and in that body
have direct representation for their protection.
State coirts are ousted of all jurisdiction over the power authorities (sec. 207 (a) (b) ).
The powers the States don't give up they still retain.
The bill fails to insure with certainty the opportunity of States to
be heard on plans to be submitted to the President
While projects of one kind and another for conservation of water,
soil, minerals, and forests are not to be constructed or carried out without future appropriations of money by the Congress, yet the plans
themselves for the projects may be submitted to the President and by
him to the Congress without assured requirement that a State affected
by the plans would be heard by the planning agency. True the bill
directs the agency to "consult and cooperate with the States" * * *
"insofar as practicable" (sec. 4 (c) ) . What is "practicable," however,
is apparently left to the agency to decide, whereas every State that is
affected by a plan to be presented to the President should be assured
with certainty of the right to be heard by the agency before the plan
is submitted.
Plans submitted by the agencies will carry prestige-perhaps, too
much to counteract on account of the sources from which they come.
It is important, therefore, that the State be heard on the plan before
the President is expected to submit it to the Congress. Since the bill
contemplates that the plans may be extensive enough to call for a coordinated or integrated development (bill, sec. 4 (b) ) of the entire
region of an agency as a whole, and even regardless of State lines, it is
all the more important that the agency should be required with absolute
certainty to provide States with an opportunity to be heard before the
plan goes to the President. Many of the States have planning commissions and other State officers well qualified to advise and to be helpful
to the agency in these matters.
The powers the States don't give up they still retain.

102

DICTA

The bill apparently gives no consideration to the reclamation of
private lands by irrigation
The planning provisions of the bill authorize the regional planning agencies to prepare and submit to the President plans providing,
among other things, for the "reclamation of public lands" (sec. 1, 5
(a), 6 (b)). No mention is made, however, of plans that would include the reclamation of private lands. The right of private land owners
to buy water is left in doubt; yet all through the West they, as well as
homesteaders on public lands, have been allowed under the Reclamation Act of 1902, as administered by the Bureau of Reclamation, to
buy water from the Government project for their privately owned lands.
Can it be that this apparent change in policy is intentional?
The point is not of much importance since other objections to
the bill are so many and so insurmountable that the one under consideration for failing to provide for the reclamation of private lands, as well
as public, would not atone for the other objections. Perhaps the chief
value of the particular objection is that it shows that the drafters of the
bill had little comprehension of reclamation problems and practices and
of the needs of the West.
The bill fails to subordinate its regional power authorities in any
respect to the law of the States in making appropriationsand uses
of water and in operating power plants.
The Congress may authorize the Federal construction and control
of a dam in a stream within a State as against the will of that State
and without regard to its laws, only in promoting navigation for the
purpose in turn of promoting interstate and foreign commerce and in
aid of national defense.
There are in the Federal Constitution no other grants of power
to the Federal Government from which the authority to override or disregard the will of a State in respect to its waters may be deduced.
The evident purpose of the bill, however, is to build and operate
power plants rather than to promote interstate commerce through improving navigation, or the national defense. If interstate or foreign
commerce or the national defense are in any way invoked to support the
power program it is only as a technical camouflage for the real purpose,
which is the generation and distribution of power.
Regional power authorities may be created by Executive order
under the bill "whenever in his (the President's) judgment the national
public interest and the interests of economy and efficiency will be served
thereby." Section 201 (a), "Public interest," and the "interests of
economy and efficiency," do not chance to be found among the grants
made by the Constitution to the Federal Government. What is found,
and very properly so, is the promotion of interstate and foreign commerce, also the promotion of national defense. That electrical energy
may be generated as a byproduct at a Government dam, built and operated in the streams of a State for either of the two primary constitutional
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purposes mentioned, is certain, but that it can't be done otherwise is
equally certain.
There are a number of instances where the Government, under the
Reclamation Act of 1902, has built dams in the streams of a State for
the purpose of irrigating the public lands as the primary purpose and
where the Government generates power as a byproduct but this use of
the waters of a State, there being no question of commerce or national
defense involved, is in pursuance of the laws of the State just as it would
be if a private person or company were to build the dam and operate
the power plant. Indeed, the Reclamation Act itself by section 8 recognizes the superior authority of the State and directs the Government
to proceed under the laws of the State.
Of the 48 States, 17 maintain an appropriation or priority system
of water law. The fundamental principle of that system is that the
appropriators or users of water take their respective supplies according
to their relative dates of initiation of use-the oldest user having the
prior legal right and the later users to take in order of seniority what
is left-and that the water may be taken and used anywhere. Seven of
these States contend that their very statehood gives them the authority to
promulgate that system regardless of any consent of the Federal Government. Others of them claim that the Congress by the act of July
26, 1866 (the act opening up the mineral portion of the public domain
to private purchase) and by the Desert Act, 1877, relinquished to the
Western States the general control of the waters within their borders
and thereby gave them the authority to establish that system of water
law to whatever extent they desired (California-Oregon Power Co. v.
Beaver-Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142).
The remaining 31 States maintain the riparian system of water
law, the fundamental principle of which is, that without conclusive
regard to any priority of use in point of time, each land ownership that
borders the stream has a right to make a reasonable use of the water.
This riparian system is predicated on the inherent authority of the State
as a State, and therefore, in legal theory, the States maintaining the
system are likewise exempt from Federal interference in the control of
the waters except when the Congress exercises its constitutional powers
either to promote interstate and foreign commerce or the national defense. These exceptions are, of course, applicable to the priority system
also.
In truth, then, under the water law of the country the general
control is in the States and the exceptions are in the Federal Government. The bill, however, recognizes no authority, not even by way
of exception, in the States.
The powers the States don't give up they still retain!
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The bill offers no assurance that in the priority or appropriationStates
of the West a power authority would not create water priorities in
one State at the expense of water interests in another.
The appropriation or priority system of water law is found in
17 States of the West. As among appropriators of water he who first
puts the water to use has a prior legal right thereto as against later users,
to the extent of the necessities of his use, and he who is second in time
is second in right, and so on throughout the series of appropriators.
Whether there is anything for the latest user in the series depends upon
whether there is enough water left in the source of supply after first
satisfying uses that are older. This is the law within the boundaries
of a priority or appropriation State.
What the law is as between States where the stream is an interstate stream is a question, the answer to which has not yet been made
clear by the United States Supreme Court. In other words, the question
is whether the rule that would be applied is that of "priority regardless
of State lines" as was laid down, with certain modifications, in the
case of Wyoming v. Colorado (259 U. S. 419) or whether it would
be "equitable division" which is a rule that would guarantee to each
State a fair amount of the water and which would do it without conclusive regard to existing uses, as announced in the case of Kansas v.
Colorado (206 U. S.46). There have been later cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court in respect to interstate streams, but they
still leave us in doubt as to the rule that would be applied. These later
cases are Connecticut v. Massachusetts (282 U. S. 660) and New
Jersey v. New York (283 U. S.336).
In this confusion of the law no State possessed of careful regard
for its water interests would want to run the risk of an authority
establishing a major Federal project in a different State on the same
interstate stream.
A project merely for power generation represents a nonconsumptive use of water and, if not retarding the flow and if in an upper State,
would do no harm to a lower State on the same stream. If, however,
the project is in a lower State then, although the use be nonconsumptive,
yet the harm to the upper State is as great as if the use were consumptive,
since under a rule of interstate priority the upper State could not, as
against the project priority in the lower State, hold back water for a
new and later use in the upper State.
It is unfair to use Federal money which is the money of all of
the States to establish a Federal water project in one State at the
expense of the water interests of another State on the same stream, unless
there is an interstate agreement between the States, assuring to the State
which does not receive the project a definite quantity or percentage of
the waters of the common stream exempt from any claim of priority
in behalf of the project so established.
The powers the States do not give up, they still retain.
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The bill offers no assurance that in the riparian States of the East a
power authority would not establish water projects in one State at
the expense of the water interests in another.
Thirty-one States, chiefly lying east of the Missouri and the Mississippi Rivers, maintain within their respective boundaries, as among
their respective water users, the riparian system of water rights, as distinguished from the priority or appropriation system. The fundamental
principle of that system is the equal right of each water user to make
a reasonable use of the waters of the stream without conclusive regard
to the age of the different uses.
Existing uses are considered as among the factors in determining
what a reasonable use would be, but they are not factors entitled to a
conclusive regard or effect, as they would be under the appropriation or
priority system. As between one riparian State and another upon the
same interstate stream the rule is that the water users of each State are
entitled, as against the water users of another State on the same stream,
to make a reasonable use of the waters, in other words, to an "equitable
division." Conn. v. Mass., 282 U. S. 660; New Jersey v. New York,
283 U. S. 336. Since, however, existing uses are factors to be considered, although not conclusive in effect, it follows that in determining
the "equitable division" as between riparian States, an existing use cannot help but have some weight. A State that receives from a power
authority a major water project, accordingly obtains thereby, practically
speaking, at least an advantage against the water interests of other States
upon the same stream.
Then, too, it is to be remembered that where the Government
constructs a project in one State it is not likely, until it gets its money
back, to invest in another in a different State on the same stream. Reimbursement may require many years and therefore may delay correspondingly development in that other State. The only proper way for the
Government to proceed is to exact an interstate compact dividing the
interstate stream in terms of quantity or percentage between the States
before financing a major water project in one of them to the injury of
another. This the Government could do easily, for, holding the money
bags, the Government could refuse a State that wants the project unless
the State enters into a compact with the other States for a division of
water recommended by the Government, and could threaten the other
States that the project would be given anyway if the recommended
division should be refused by them. A riparian State, therefore, having
regard to its own future water development, should not run the risk
of allowing major projects to become established in other States on the
same stream until there shall have been formulated between them an
interstate compact determining the percentage or quantity of water
which the State or States not receiving the project are to have. It is
not fair to use Federal money to forward one State at the expense of
the water interests of another.
The powers the States don't give up they still retain.
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The bill arbitrarily prohibits the pollution of streams by miring,
milling, and manufacturing industriesand by municipalitiesregardless
of effect on interstatecommerce.
By section 8 of the bill "it shall be unlawful for any person by any
sewer pipe outlet or other means, devices, or practices to pollute or make
unsightly waters of, or flowing into, navigable streams or other streams
over which the Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate
commerce of foreign nations and among the several States."
This prohibition purports to be absolute, and it is nearly as broad
as it is absolute, for most streams either are navigable or else are tributaries of streams that are navigable. Apparently it makes no difference
whether the pollution does any harm to the national defense or to commerce among the States and with foreign nations, the protection of
which and the national defense are the only constitutional sources of the
authority of the Congress over the waters of the country. Again, there
is no provision for consent to the pollution even when interstate and
foreign commerce and the 'national defense are not interfered with.
Since the prohibition runs against "any person" it runs against mining,
milling, and manufacturing industries, and also municipalities. Industries and municipalities cannot be operated without polluting to some
extent the country's streams. Can it be that those industries and those
municipalities are now to abstain from even necessary pollution and,
therefore, to cease operation? Or shall the Government refrain from
interference save when interstate and foreign commerce or the national
defense are interfered with? The prohibition of the bill extends not
only to navigable streams but to their tributaries as well. Better by
far to leave the question of pollution when interstate and foreign commerce and the national defense are not involved, or actually interfered
with, where it is now-in the States themselves. They best can determine the extent of pollution that is necessary and suppress the unnecessary. They best can look after the public health of their peoples. If a
stream is interstate and if one State pollutes unduly as against another
State upon the same stream, the latter has its remedy in the Supreme
Court of the United States, which will formulate and apply the proper
rule.
The bill in prohibiting all pollution goes as far as to direct the
Attorney General to proceed against the polluter and to authorize a
temporary injunction without bond. Can it be that the industries are
to be closed perhaps unlawfully during the temporary injunction period
without reimbursement for damages suffered?
The powers the States do not give up they still retain.
Power projects
The bill authorizes its regional power authorities to construct and
operate power plants and transmission lines and to distribute and sell
electric energy at wholesale or retail (sec. 203 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)).
The President by Executive order may create as many of these power
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authorities, and without regard to the boundaries of the seven regions,
as he may deem best in the public interest, subject to the limitation that
he shall "create or establish no more than one regional power authority
for the administration of hydroelectric facilities and appurtenant works
which are, or may be, economically interconnected by transmission
lines" (sec. 201 (a)).
Unconfined as the President would be to the boundaries of any
one of the seven regions which are taken as the units for general planning purposes under the planning portion of the bill, free as he would be
to establish as many of these authorities as he may desire save for the
limitation mentioned, it is evident that Government plants are no longer
to be introduced, as once stated, merely for "yardstick" purposes here
and there, but rather that they are gradually to absorb the entire field
of market demand as rapidly as possible. A further evidence of this fact
is to be found in the provisions to the effect that where the Government
sells power at wholesale for redistribution the public agenies such as
States and municipalities and cooperatives are to be preferred over
private purchasers (sec. 203 (d)).
Opinion on the wisdom of this course depends upon how socialistically inclined the- owner of the opinion may be. If he favors governmental competition with privately owned but publicly regulated
power projects, he will favor this function of the authorities with all of
its completeness; otherwise not. Or, if he favors the generation of
energy by the authorities, but on account of the great number of employees needed and the danger of political operation he is opposed to
having the Government, through these agencies, engage in the distribution of the energy generated, he will favor the generation but oppose
giving the authority more than the right to generate and to wholesale
the energy generated, thus leaving the distribution among consumers to
some private distributing agencies under public regulation. So. too, if,
for much the same reason, he is opposed to discrimination against private
purchasers in favor of public, he will be opposed to the bill.
The negotiation of interstate compacts would be undesirably and
unconstitutionally interfered with
Where streams are interstate and the question arises as to how the
waters are to be divided between the States and their respective peoples,
the States either settle the question by interstate agreement negotiated
by their official representatives with the consent of the Congress, or else
settle it by suit between the States in the Supreme Court of the United
States. These are the constitutional methods (Federal Constitution,
arts. I, sec. 10 (2), and III, sec. 2 (1)).
Under the bill an interstate agreement must be approved by the
President (sec. 7). The President, in nearly all cases, could not by any
possibility be coming from the States affected, and he might have other
ideas than those of the States concerning the agreement. When, however as now, the Congress is the one to give or withhold consent to an
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interstate compact, the matter not only goes first to a committee where
the States may be heard, but they have in the Congress their Senators
and Representatives perfectly capable of representing and protecting their
interests, more capable, indeed, than any one else.
Under the bill (sec. 7) as worded, if constitutional, no further
legislation would be required to take from the States the power to
make interstate compacts free from the consent of the President. The
constitutionality of the bill on this point may well be doubted. The
power to approve or disapprove interstate agreements is a vital one. The
framers of the Constitution put it in the Congress not in the Executive
(Constitution, art. III, sec. 2 (1)). Very likely a power so important
cannot be delegated lawfully. Certainly wisdom suggests it be left
where it is-in the Congress where the States affected can always be
heard by committees and receive the protection of their Senators and
Representatives.
The powers the States don't give up, they still retain!
The Administrator and the directors of the Power Authorities might
be unfamiliar with and unfriendly to the regions to which appointed
Under the bill the Presidents are to appoint the Administrator of
the Authority with confirmation by the Senate (sec. 201 (d)). They
are to appoint the directors also but without necessity of confirmation
(sec. 201 (e) ). There is no requirement that any of these appointees
shall come from the different States constituting the power region to
which assigned. Since the directors could be appointed without confirmation by the Senate, they could go into the power regions as political
carpetbaggers.
The powers the States don't give up they still retain.
The bill requires the Authorities to classify their proposed projects for
construction in order of urgency in point of relieving unemployment

Section 6 (d) of the bill provides "Plans shall classify the various
construction projects with a view to the construction of projects in the

order of their urgency, so as most beneficially to promote the national
welfare by stabilizing employment and relieving unemployment."
Undoubtedly there would be some projects of one kind or another
which, if constructed in one State, would do no direct or particular
harm to other States not receiving them, and as to which projects the

urgency of providing employment might well be taken into consideration; for it is to be remembered that the various projects in respect to
which the authorities are to plan and which the authorities may operate,
concern the conservation of the soil, minerals, waters, and forests of
the Nation. When, however, the natural resource is what by nature
is a common resource such as an interstate stream, and when we reflect
that under the law governing the division of interstate waters between
States and their respective peoples there is no certainty that the State
receiving the authority's water project would not, thereby, acquire a
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water priority in the priority or appropriation States, or a water advantage in the riparian States against other States not receiving it, then
the folly of constructing in the order of urgency of employment of
workers as distinguished from advancing and protecting the real present
and future interests of States in respect to their waters, becomes apparent
at once. No major project intended to put water to beneficial use should
be built upon an interstate stream with Federal money (Federal money
is the money of all of the States) unless the Government rquires from
the State which is to receive the project an interstate agreement with the
other States not receiving it, guaranteeing them a quantity or percentage
of interstate water undiminished by any claim in favor of the project.
In all such cases the Government by reason of holding the purse, can
quite easily extract the agreement, for the Government can inform the
State supposed to receive the project, that the project will not be constructed unless an agreement is made with the other States guaranteeing
to them a certain percentage or quantity of water, and can inform the
other States that if they do not agree to the quantity or percentage
suggested by the Government that then the project will be constructed
anyway. Thus, through the power of the purse, the Government can
exact an interstate agreement if it wants to do so.
Where Government money is not involved in the development of
water projects on interstate streams but only the money of States or
their subdivisions, or their citizens, the States, of course, are to try
without compulsion to reach an interstate agreement, or, failing that,
they may take their differences to the United States Supreme Court.
The powers the States do not give up they still retain.
The bill indicates a movement to center the control of the economic
life of the country very largely in a succession of Presidents through
regional instrumentalitiesamenable to their will.
The following points are to be noticed in the bill:
First. That the director and members of the planning agencies
and the directors of the power authorities are to be appointed by the
President, and the agencies and authorities are to be controlled by the
President (secs. 3 (b), (c), 4 (a), 201 (e)). Through the citations
referred to, it appears expressly that the planning agencies are to be
thus controlled. As for the power authorities, the control would be
similarly held because of the fact that the directors of the power authority, who by vote would control the policies of the Authority, are to be
appointed by the President without fixed terms and without confirmation by the Senate (sec. 201 (e)).
Second. That the President may change the boundaries of any
of the seven regions without consulting the Congress. Section 2.
Third. That he may create power authorities without regard to
the boundaries of the seven regions and in such number and in such
places as he may deem best and do it without consulting the Congress
and may control them after he creates them. Section 20.
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Fourth. That he may without consulting the Congress transfer
to the power authorities, and therefore to be similarly controlled by
him, the "facilities capable of producing the hydroelectric power (together with appurtenant works) constructed, under construction or
hereafter constructed by or on behalf of the United States," meaning
Since
by any other branch of the Government. Section 201 (a).
power generating "facilities" would include all the physical structures
and equipment necessary to power generation, and since if there were
any doubt about that point, the doubt is dispelled by the precautionary
phrase "appurtenant works," it follows that the President could transfer practically the entirety of any other Government project as far as
concerns dam, spillways, outlet gates and valves, powerhouse, and
generators to the control of a Power Authority and, therefore, to the
control'of the President, if only the generation of power happens to
be any one of a number of functions served by the project transferred.
Fifth. Under the planning provisions of the bill, the planning
agencies are to plan, under the President's control, for the conservation
and development of the soil, forest, mineral, and water resources of the
country and for the improvement of navigation and control of floods,
and are to do all this by regions (secs. 4 (b), 5 (a)). Such provisions
imply the probability that, sooner or later, an effort will be made to
create corporate regional instrumentalities and to invest in them the duty
of carrying out the plans by constructing and operating the necessary
projects and activities. In that event these corporate regional instrumentalities would be similarly subject to the control of the President.
The bill already contemplates the transfer of certain other projects to
its power authorities (sec. 201 (a)). It would be easy to create seven
regional corporate authorities and transfer to them all projects within
their borders. Indeed, why the planning by the seven regions, if there
are not to be seven regional authorities to carry out the regional plans
and operate the regional projects? The one seems to imply the other.
Already there is a pending bill containing similar planning provisions,
known as the Norris bill, S. 2555, that contemplates just such regional
authorities. Doubtless more such bills would follow if the Mansfield
bill were to pass. And if such regional authorities were to come they
would bring with them their additional restrictions upon the States,
including even the prohibition against putting dams in streams, in other
words, against making new uses of water, without the consent of the
authorities.
Sixth. Many functions of the States would be taken from them,
as already more specifically mentioned.
These considerations support the conclusion that the bill indicates
a movement to centralize economic control in great degree in the successive Presidents of the United States. This centralized control, this
subjection of the States, this curtailment and usurpation of their functions are, in the present instance, more than unnecessary. They are in
their trend a denial of representative democracy. Representative democracy does not consist in popular election alone. It requires fully as
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laws under which the people are to live and which it is the function of
the Executive to carry out.
The powers the States don't give up, they still retain.
HOW TO PRESERVE THE GOOD IN THE BILL

The bill contains some good, and what it does contain ought to
be preserved. The bill itself, however, is not necessary to the preservation. In fact, it stands in the way because of its curtailment of the
functions of various agencies of the Government and because of its
encroachment upon the rights of the States.
The good contained in the bill consists of its idea of comprehensive
planning for the development and use of our natural resources. Stream
systems, for instance, ought to be developed in such wise as to make
sure that each State receives the use of an equitable part of the water as
against the claims of other States on the same interstate stream. When,
to accomplish this division and protection, interstate compacts are necessary, the compacts should be negotiated under the auspices and recommendation of the Federal Government and then submitted to the States
affected and to the Congress for ratification.
The general planning should be done by the Government in cooperation with the States. For this purpose the Government has plenty
of existing agencies: The Reclamation Bureau, Corps of Army Engineers, Soil Conservation Service, Forest Service, Federal Power Commission, and the National Resources Committee. Federal regional instrumentalities such as are set up by the bill are unnecessary either to
plan or carry out plans. The existing Federal agencies can develop the
plans in cooperation with the States. The plans then can be presented
to the Congress, be discussed in the committees, receive the consideration
of the Senators and Representatives, the Governors, attorneys general,
and water officers of the affected States. There is no need of creating
the proposed regional instrumentalities, which would impair existing
Federal agencies, encroach upon the rights of the States and centralize
economic and political control in a succession of Presidents. The course
recommended would create no new bureaus or instrumentalities, would
cost less, and would be more in the public interest.

LEGAL STENOGRAPHERS
By LUCILE KAUFMAN, Director,

Q

DENVER JUNIOR CONSULTATION CENTER.
UITE a number of young women have come to the Den-

ver Junior Consultation Center who are interested in becoming legal stenographers.
Occasionally the employment
and aptitude tests of the Center indicate that these young
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ladies have exceptional ability and if given the opportunity
for training would probably succeed in this line of work.
At the present time there is no central office where these
young women may register as beginning legal stenographers.
Experienced legal stenographers may, of course, register with
public or private employment agencies. The inexperienced
young woman who is interested in beginning stenography
in a doctor's office may register at the office of the Colorado
Medical Association. It would be advantageous to the lawyers of Denver if, when they find it necessary to employ an
inexperienced stenographer, they could select their applicant
from a group who are definitely interested in this field and
who have sufficient skill and aptitude to develop satisfactorily.
The Denver Junior Consultation Center could maintain a
separate file from which legal stenographers could be selected
for interviews upon the request of the lawyer. This file
would contain test results, references, and other pertinent
information.
It might prove helpful if a committee of the Denver
Bar Association prepared a rating sheet indicating standards
which they would like to see established for legal stenographers. It would be helpful if they would analyze and
outline fundamental legal forms and procedures which every
legal stenographer must know. If such an analysis were
made it would serve as a basis for a vestibule training course
for legal stenographers. A class could be organized in a
Denver school and a competent teacher secured if ten or fifteen
members were assured. This class could be made available
to the beginners now employed in lawyers' offices and to a few
members on the waiting list. Several classes each year would
always assure a waiting list of applicants who are capable
and who have had some special training. This plan would
save the lawyers and the skilled secretaries the added burden
and loss of time necessitated when a new unskilled person
must be trained. It also provides a definite program for the
young women who wish to enter the legal stenographic profession.

BANKS AND BANKING-MERGER-LIABILITIES-ESTOPPEL-TAX-

ATION--Crosby, etc. vs. First National Bank of Holyoke-No.
14175-Decided February 14, 1938-District Court of Phillips
County-Hon. Arlington Taylor, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
First National Bank of Holyoke took over business and
assets of Citizens State Bank of same city as a result of negotiations
between the two banks between 1930 and May 29th, 1931. In complying with the State Statute concerning voluntary liquidation of state
banks, both banks submitted statements to the Bank Commissioner
stating that the assets of the latter bank had been transferred to the
former which assumed all liability of record under date of transfer of
assets, etc. A bond was also furnished the Commissioner to protect
the creditors of the Citizens Bank. The County Treasurer brought
suit against the First National Bank to collect $1,526.38, being the tax
on the capital stock of the Citizens Bank for 193 1. It was contended
by the defendant that its contract did not provide that it was to pay
such an item. The plaintiff contended that the bank was estopped
to raise such a question. The trial court ignored the question of estoppel and held for defendant.
HELD:
1. Where two banks effect a merger and each notifies
the State Banking Commissioner of the transfer of the assets of one
to the other, and a bond is deposited to insure the payment of all debts
of the former, but refers to a contract between the banks which omit
reference to the capital stock tax, the remaining bank is estopped to
deny its liability for such tax where the terms of such contract are not
conveyed to the commissioner.
2. The rule that "where there is no evidence that any of the
representations were made to the treasurer personally, to his prejudice, he
may not rely on the principle of estoppel" does not apply here. Where
the representation is so general in its terms, or made under such circumstances, as to indicate that it was intended to reach and influence third
persons or the community at large, the doctrine of estoppel is carried
sufficiently far to protect everyone who has innocently acted upon or
been governed by it.
3. The capital stock was subject to the tax for 1931 on the
basis of its value as of April 1, 1931, and it is immaterial that at the
time of the transaction, the amount of the tax had not been ascertained.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young concur.
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POLLUTION OF INJUNCTION MINING The Slide
Mines, Inc. vs. The Left Hand Ditch Company et al.-Decided
February 21, 1938-District Court of Boulder County-Hon.
Claude C. Coffin, Judge-Affirmed.

WATER

FACTS:
Defendant in error shall be referred to as the farmers
and the plaintiff in error as the mining company. At the suit of the
farmers, as appropriators for irrigation and domestic purposes, the
mining company was permanently enjoined from polluting the waters
with mill tailings and slimes developed in its milling operations.
HELD:
1. Where actionable pollution is found to exist at the
time suit is filed and thereafter continued, an injunction properly cannot be denied because of arrangements which promise no future transgression but do not so insure.
2.
If the system devised by the mining company to prevent the
pollution of the stream by its mill tailings is not effectual in preventing
such defined pollution in fact, the pollution may be enjoined.
3.
Pollution is an impairment, with attendant injury, to the
use of the water that plaintiffs are entitled to make.
IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Young concur.
Mr. Justice Bouck specially concurs.

TAX SALES--CERTIFICATES-REDEMPTION-Roley vs. Creel et al.No. 14101-Decided January 31, 1938-District Court of
Pueblo County-Hon. John H. Voorhees, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Suit by Roley, fee holder of real estate, to enjoin County
Treasurer from issuing tax deed. Property sold for 1930 taxes and
certificate of purchase issued to County. Like defaults occurred in
1931, 1932 and 1933.
These were endorsed on the certificate of
purchase, making the total due thereon, $2,000.00.
The 1934 taxes
were also unpaid.
The County Commissioners resolved on December
23, 1935, to sell the certificate for $670.86, provided, the purchaser
would also pay the 1934 taxes, or a total of $1,000.00.
M paid
that sum and received an assignment of the tax certificate.
Plaintiff
contended Section 1, Chapter 217, S. L. 1935 (1935 C. S. A., Chapter 142, Section 209) precluded the County Commissioners from making sale of the tax certificate in question before December 31, 1935,
until when, as said, the fee owner of the property was privileged to
pay the taxes on his property, delinquent August 1, 1934, with abatement of interest and penalties.
Plaintiff did not attempt to pay the
taxes as provided by statute, but supplied his representative with
$1010.00, who on the day the transaction with M was closed, but subsequent thereto, offered $1010.00 for the certificate.
The offer was
rejected because of the prior sale. The plaintiff then instituted this
suit and paid into Court $1005.00 for M's use.
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HELD: 1. The sum which the redeemer was bound to pay was
considerably in excess of the amount tendered. The law does not provide that an owner may make purchase of outstanding tax certificates
against his property. He can be relieved from tax defaults only by
paying the sum required by law, mathematically ascertained, to the
County Treasurer.
2. The owner had only his right to redeem, and this was open to
him and was not impaired by the sale which the County Commissioners made of the tax certificate against his property. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
INSURANCE-DOUBLE

INDEMNITY-New York Life Insurance Com-

pany vs. Matiano-No. 14273-Decided January 31, 1938District Court of Las Animas County-Hon. David M. Ralston,
Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. Where policy of insurance providing double indemnity for accidental death, contains a provision as follows:
"Double indemnity shall not be payable if insured's death resulted
* * * from any bacterial infection other than bacterial infection occurring in consequence of accidental and external bodily injury,"
double indemnity may not be recovered where death results from
botulism contracted through eating home canned beans containing
"bacillus botulinus." EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Knous dissent.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-RECREATION-ACCIDENTS--Industrial Commission of Colorado, State
Compensation Insurance Fund, and Minnesota Mines, Inc. vs.
Jerry J. Murphy-Decided February 14, 1938-District Court
of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
The sole question is whether the injury complained of
by Murphy arose out of and in the course of his employment by the
Minnesota Mines, Inc.
Upon suggestion by an employee of the company that a baseball
team, to play on Sundays, be organized, the company, by one of its
officers, offered to "match dollar for dollar" the expense of the organization. The team was known by the company name, but no one was
obliged to play or attend the games, and no man was ever employed
or discharged because of baseball only. Six of the players were employees of the company. Players usually furnished their own transThe team went to Colorado Springs to play, Murphy takportation.
ing three men in an automobile belonging to the company which he
borrowed for that purpose. On the return trip the Murphy car col-
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lided with another in Vernon Canon and Murphy was permanently
injured. District Court allowed the claim.
1. Allowance of this claim could but serve as a warnHELD:
ing to employers that they may concern themselves with the social life
and recreation of their men, or permit their officers to do so or contribute to efforts to lighten life, only under penalty or liability for
every accident and injury arising from such activities, however remote
from the employment itself. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
VAGRANCY-GAMBLING-POLICE

COURTS-BURDEN

OF PROOF-

ORDINANCES-EVIDENCE-Handler vs. City and County of
Denver-No. 14249-Decided February 14, 1938-County
Court of Denver-Hon. Osmer E. Smith, Judge-Affirmed in
part and reversed in part.
FACTS: Defendant convicted in Police Court on charges of vagrancy and gambling. He appealed to County Court where he was
acquitted of the gambling charge, but convicted of vagrancy, fined
$100.00 and sentenced to the County Jail for 30 days.
1. Where the original process under which the defendHELD:
ant was arrested and convicted in Police Court recited sections 1345
and 1346 of the Municipal Code, charging defendant with vagrancy
such is a sufficient allegation of violation of the ordinance.
2. One who leads an idle, immoral or profligate course of life,
is guilty of vagrancy, under section 1345 of the 1927 Municipal Code.
3. Where a party litigant introduces into evidence the 1927
Municipal Code, such book of ordinances shall be taken and considered
as prima facie evidence that such ordinances have been published as
provided by law, and the burden of proof is on the other party to
prove that the ordinance has been changed, and such proof requires
more than merely casting a doubt or suspicion upon the validity of the
ordinance.
4. A sentence of both a fine of $100.00 and thirty days in jail
is not allowed under the ordinance. The provisions of the ordinance
as to the sentence and fine are separable and distinct, and therefore,
the judgment as to the fine stands.
5.
Violation of municipal ordinances, being civil in their nature,
does not require the strict proof of criminal prosecutions.
6. Where a preponderance of the evidence indicated defendant
was guilty of vagrancy; that he had no visible means of support other
than those which he had received from the course he had been pursuing
over a long period of time; that he had been found guilty of gambling
and vagrancy on previous charges no less than five times, the trial Court
was correct in its finding of vagrancy under the ordinance.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke, Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.

